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Introduction   
This report examines China’s foreign policy in fragile states. With its economic rise over 
the last three decades, China has come to play an increasingly prominent role on the world stage. 
Accounts of Chinese foreign policy often focus either on China’s relationship to other great 
powers or its expansion into a specific region, such as Africa or Latin America. Here we attempt 
to approach Chinese foreign policy from a different angle—namely, that of its policy in countries 
of heightened political instability. Does China have a specific policy for fragile states, as distinct 
from its various regional strategies? To begin to answer this question, we examine the cases of 
four fragile states in different parts of the world: Angola, Venezuela, Afghanistan, and Nepal. 
Our research draws on published economic data and recent scholarship on China’s political 
objectives. Our conclusion is that China goes to great lengths to foster stability, particularly in 
countries with strategic importance, even if it does not have a specific “fragile states” policy. 
Fragile States 
For the purposes of this report, we define fragile states as those whose near-term political 
survival is not assured. The Fund for Peace’s annual “World Fragility Index” ranks all countries 
on fragility according to twelve criteria, including “human rights and rule of law,” “state 
legitimacy,” “uneven economic development, and others.”1 Rather than focusing on the top 
“fragile” states on this list, however (most of which are in sub-Saharan Africa), for this report we 
have sought to spread our case studies as widely as possible across the globe. This approach lets 
us start to identify a potential Chinese policy toward fragile states as such, rather than toward 
sub-Saharan Africa specifically, where many fragile states are concentrated. Still, three of the 
states chosen rank relatively high on the list: Afghanistan (9), Nepal (33), and Angola (37). The 
fourth, Venezuela (63), is currently facing a severe economic and political crisis that is arguably 
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more acute than the situations in the other countries, even if its characteristics do not match the 
Fund for Peace algorithm.  
Not coincidentally, China’s own stability has provided scholars fertile ground for debate. 
Susan Shirk, in China: Fragile Superpower (2007), argues that despite its growing strength 
abroad, China faced serious destabilizing factors at home, including income inequality and 
corruption.2 Others point out that predictions of the fall of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
have long been mistaken.3 In any event, one reason for the government’s single-minded pursuit 
of prosperity, through development at home and investment abroad, is to shore up domestic 
support for a regime whose legitimacy is tied increasingly to economic growth. 
China’s Foreign Policy 
In the early 1990s, after it violently suppressed the Tiananmen protests of 1989 that 
threatened the survival of the regime, the party found itself in need of a lasting solution to 
popular discontent. For Deng Xiaoping, whose “reform and opening” policy had started to raise 
economic output in the 1980s, the solution lay in economic liberalization. Deng’s 1992 “southern 
tour” to Shenzhen, Guangdong, Zhuhai, and Shanghai gave a boost to market reforms, 
highlighting the potential of special economic zones to attract foreign investment. The party 
wagered that with economic openness, political grievances would recede into the background, 
and in effect it offered prosperity in exchange for obedience.4 For the rest of the 1990s, under 
Jiang Zemin, the country continued to build its economic strength while avoiding taking a 
leadership role in international matters, following Deng’s maxim of “keeping a low profile and 
biding time”.5 
 The new century marked a turning point in China’s rise. In 2001, it joined the World 
Trade Organization and won its bid to host the 2008 Olympics. That same year, Premier Zhu 
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Rongji gave a speech to the National People’s Congress outlining a “going out” strategy that 
encouraged Chinese firms to invest abroad.6 This policy spurred the growth of private 
companies, as opposed to traditionally dominant state-owned enterprises, even while state-
controlled banks—in particular China Development Bank (CDB) and China Export-Import Bank 
(China Exim Bank)—played a key role in underwriting these companies’ activities.7 Before this 
policy, in the 1980s and 1990s, Chinese outward direct investment was minimal; after 2003, 
investment took a sharp upward tick, and in 2010, it became the fifth-largest source of foreign 
direct investment in the world.8 Even with liberalization, China remains a directed economy, a 
fact which helps shape public and private foreign investment decisions. 
Under the administrations of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao (2002-12), China’s presence in 
the economies of Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Americas expanded dramatically, through both 
private and state-owned enterprises, prompting sustained speculation about its intentions and 
prospects. Scholars in the West, and particularly in the US, began to wonder whether China’s 
rise would be peaceful, whether the country would be a “responsible stakeholder” in the 
international order, and whether it would replace the US as the global hegemon. In this vein, 
Martin Jacques and Howard French have argued that China is a “civilization state” that views its 
growing prominence as a return to its rightful position at the center of the world order after a 
two-hundred-year hiatus.9 Susan Shirk, David Shambaugh, Thomas Christensen, and Lyle 
Goldstein note the risks that China’s rise poses to the West but emphasize the very real 
opportunities for cooperation and prosperity.10 
On the hawkish fringe, Michael Pillsbury and Peter Navarro view China as a threat to the 
United States, and see its growing economic clout as a harbinger of future military strength.11 
Elizabeth Economy, Michael Levi, Kevin Gallagher, and Roberto Porzecanski have noted the 
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transformative impact that China’s pursuit of natural resources, particularly oil, is having on 
commodity-producing countries, increasing exports but weighting them toward raw materials.12 
Other scholars, like William Norris and Benjamin Creutzfeldt, highlight the multiplicity of 
people and institutions behind the country’s expansion; rather than ask what “China” is doing in 
Africa, for example, they examine the relationship between the state actor and the individual 
economic “agents.”13 
Since 2008, and particularly since Xi Jinping took office in 2012, China has adopted a 
more assertive posture toward the US—the “New Truculence,” in Kaiser Kuo’s description14—
seen in its recent anger over the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) missile defense system and its refusal to recognize the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration’s decision on its territorial claims in the South China Sea. Willy Wo-Lap Lam sees 
Xi’s foreign policy as a departure from that of Deng, Jiang, and Hu; he observes that Xi has 
replaced “biding time” with “proactively seeking achievements”.15 How Chinese foreign policy 
will change during the presidency of Donald Trump—and in particular, whether China will take 
a leadership role on climate change and trade liberalization—are open questions. 
What is clear is that China is actively raising its profile around the world. Broad 
initiatives like the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) plan to connect China to Europe via South 
and Central Asia through transportation infrastructure, and institutions like Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, are indications that China is 
now much more willing to take a leadership role in international diplomacy. In peacekeeping 
operations, too, China has begun to play a more prominent part, contributing over 8,000 troops in 
2015, over 20% of the all troops worldwide.16 
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As a source of aid and investment, China has become an increasingly popular benefactor 
for governments in developing countries, because unlike the World Bank or other Western 
lenders, its loans come largely free of political strings. China frequently cites its policy of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of other countries and emphasizes that its deals are “win-
wins”, beneficial for everyone involved. Still, in some countries, particularly in Africa, its 
presence has fueled concerns that it is playing an outsize role in local economies, and that its 
concern is not mutual benefit but securing strategic resources and developing markets.17 
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Methodology 
This report is the culmination of a four-month study based on academic and policy 
literature, published data, news articles, and government documents. In this methodology 
section, we will briefly describe the framework that guided our research, as well as our 
justification for our four case study selections. As a general note, a key challenge in this project 
is the fact that China is very opaque about the amount and nature of its foreign aid. Additionally, 
due to the somewhat opaque nature of each state, information on those countries tends to be 
uneven. We believe the numbers in this report paint a good picture, but these caveats should be 
kept in mind. 
Framework and Sources 
At the beginning of this project, we established a theoretical framework in order to keep a 
common approach to our individual case studies. The overarching questions in our project are as 
follows: 
• What goals is China pursuing in fragile states and how is it pursuing them? 
• Does China have a foreign investment or aid model specific to fragile states?   
Additionally, our framework included four broad areas that we explored in our research. 
For each country, we focused on the historical context, the nature of China’s interests and 
presence, the trajectory of its aid and involvement, and the perception of the host country. 
Ultimately, not all questions were equally important in each case study, but each study has the 
same structure. 
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Case Study Selection 
We chose four case studies based on the Fund for Peace Fragile States Index, current 
events, a desire for geographic diversity, and interest and expertise. The selected case studies are 
as follows: 
Angola 
As the 37th most fragile state in the world, according to the Fund for Peace Index, Angola 
is neither the most fragile state in Africa nor the most fragile African state where China is 
involved.18 Our decision to choose Angola rested on a few key issues. First, it is still recovering 
from its 27-year civil war, which ended in 2002 and continues to impact how the country 
functions. Second, the majoritarian ruling party has a consistent need to prove its legitimacy to 
its people and suffers from the pitfalls of many developing states the world over. Namely, 
beyond poverty and unemployment, the government is ranked the 164th most corrupt country in 
the world, receives a 1 out of 12 in government functionality, and has a declining level of 
freedom according to Freedom House.19 Third, Angola presents a historic and well-documented 
method of Chinese involvement, featuring resource-backed loans in exchange for Chinese-built 
infrastructure. Called the “Angola Model,” it has been exported to other resource rich African 
states and presents a viable starting point for discerning whether such a model, or one that is 
similar, has been exported beyond the African continent and into Latin America and China’s 
neighbors. 
Venezuela 
Of the four countries examined here, Venezuela is arguably the one whose immediate 
future is most uncertain, even though it does not figure high on most indices. Runaway inflation 
and shortages of basic goods have crippled the country’s economy, particularly since the global 
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fall in oil prices in 2014. Recent attempts by President Nicolás Maduro to consolidate power, 
particularly through the Supreme Court’s ruling to dissolve the National Assembly, have sparked 
international condemnation and domestic unrest. As of this writing, in mid-April 2017, massive, 
sustained protests have descended on Caracas, calling for new elections.20 China has invested 
heavily in Venezuela over the last decade—more than in any other Latin American country—
mainly through commodity-backed loans. The current crisis poses a risk to China’s investments: 
not only is Venezuela unable to make needed upgrades to develop its oil infrastructure, it may 
also soon be forced to default on its loan repayment. 
Nepal 
Nepal was selected for this study because of both its fragility and its unique geographic 
location. According to the Fund for Peace, Nepal is the 33rd most fragile state in the world, 
largely due to the lingering effects of the 1996-2006 civil war that left more than 12,000 dead 
and 1,000 missing.21 With over 760 miles of shared border with China—all of it with the 
politically charged area of Tibet—this instability within Nepal offers a set of political incentives 
and pressures for Beijing that are unique among the countries in this study. Additionally, Nepal 
does not have the international political attention and Western involvement that Afghanistan has, 
which also alters China’s political calculus and adds diversity to this study.  
Afghanistan 
Afghanistan has a number of characteristics that made it a compelling case in this study. 
It is ranked as the ninth most fragile state in the world by the Fund for Peace, and it is the setting 
for a conflict that has lasted for more than a decade. Currently, violence continues, and the 
Taliban controls the most territory it has held since the U.S. invasion in 2001.22 Additionally, 
Afghanistan is among the poorest countries in the world, and its political situation is far from 
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stable. Afghanistan shares only a small portion of its border with China, but its proximity has 
raised security concerns for China, particularly with regard to its Muslim Uyghur community. 
While its relationship with Afghanistan has been limited, especially compared to its historically 
closer alliance with Pakistan, China has started to take a more and more active role in the past 
few years. The withdrawal of Western troops in the future will provide a new opportunity and 
test for China.   
 Limitations and areas for future exploration 
Each of the countries that this report will explore is in some sort of transition. This paper 
reflects the current situation, but has been written perhaps before certain trends, scenarios, and 
policy changes have been fully realized. In addition, the preliminary nature of the research and 
time constraints meant we were unable to travel to any of the countries. Thus, to better 
understand China’s strategy in each case, future researchers should continue to watch for 
changes in behavior and support in the coming years. 
Future projects on this topic may also benefit by expanding the number of case studies. It 
would be interesting to look at multiple fragile states to see the similarities and differences in 
China’s approach within each region, as well as to study whether changes in policy in one 
country affect China’s policies in neighboring countries.   
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Chinese Engagement in Angola 
Historical Context 
 China’s history with modern Angola dates to the country’s anticolonial struggle for 
independence from Portugal, which began in 1961. China initially backed the Marxist party that 
would eventually win control of Angola, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola 
(MPLA), but later abandoned that faction in favor of two other factions once the MPLA aligned 
with the Soviet Union.23 Following Angola’s declaration of independence in 1975 and the 
outbreak of what would be a 27-year civil war, China backed factions competing with the MPLA 
for Angolan rule, primarily the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola 
(UNITA).24 Even after establishing official diplomatic ties with the independent, MPLA-run 
Angola in 1983, China continued to provide arms and materiel to UNITA and other armed 
groups through the 1990s.25 
 Following the end of the Angolan Civil War in 2002, China funded some small-scale 
infrastructure projects for rehabilitation of electric grids and of the Luanda railway.26 China 
began negotiations to provide Angola with large scale development assistance in 2002, agreed to 
a framework agreement with Angola in 2003, and offered its first resource-backed loan of $2 
billion for infrastructure projects in 2005.27 Such an offer allowed Angola to be less dependent 
on Western aid, which often came with conditions requiring Angola to reform its governance 
practices and improve transparency, something Angola was averse to doing, as it wanted to 
rebuild the country first and worry about reforming the government later.28 Since then, China has 
provided billions in resource-backed loans for post-war reconstruction Angola, Chinese 
companies have invested in the economy of Angola, and Angola has the third largest leading oil 
supplier to China. 
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 This exchange of funds from Chinese institutions, the opening of Angola to investment 
from Chinese private and state-owned enterprises, and the supply of oil from Angola to China 
has been productive to the point that it was given a name, “the Angola Model,” which China 
exported to other resource-rich African states, such as the Democratic of Republic of Congo. 
Interests 
The goals and impact of China’s involvement in Angola are the subject of debate. Some 
scholars see China’s actions as a straightforward grab for the natural resources it needs to fuel its 
own economy, a new imperialism and yet another way for the outside world to exploit Africa.29 
Others see a more complex strategy whereby China is utilizing an aid structure learned through 
its own experience of receiving aid, wherein traditional aid was mixed with other types of 
economic development that benefited both the donor and the recipient and reflected the needs of 
each country involved.30 
 While China certainly requires natural resources, is actively purchasing them from 
Africa, and is often also building the infrastructure necessary to do so, its need for oil is not the 
sole benefit China receives from its engagement in Angola. There are other benefits for China 
from its interactions here and in other African states that are more compelling and in line with 
China’s long-term interests. With respect to Angola, China’s interests lie in the political realm, in 
the interest of stability, and in economics. 
Political  
There has always been a political element to China’s involvement in Angola. What has 
changed is the magnitude to which political goals play in China’s involvement. Initially, its 
decision to involve itself with Angola was purely political, first to support anti-colonial rebellion 
and then to support UNITA and other anti-MPLA groups in order to offset the influence of the 
P A G E  | 12 
 
Soviet Union.31 Following the end of the Angolan Civil War, China saw an opportunity to 
intensify relations with a new, stabilizing Angola. Such decisions were likely not based on 
political needs, but in so doing China secured Angola’s recognition of the One China policy, a 
key Chinese goal being to get as many African states as possible to recognize Beijing over 
Taipei.32 
Stability 
 Instability in Angola is not a direct threat to Chinese national security. However, 
instability in Angola, whether political or violent, could have large-scale impacts on Chinese 
interests in Angola. Because the Angolan government is highly insular and nontransparent, with 
growing discontent over rampant corruption, political instability could affect Chinese companies 
in seeking permits or securing contracts. Such effects would lead to a slowdown in Chinese 
business. It could also cause Angola to default on its loans, leading to an economic loss for 
China. In addition, political and/or violent instability in Angola could put the estimated 259,000 
Chinese living in Angola at risk, especially if they are seen to have supported a corrupt 
government.33  
Thus, China has an interest in securing its capital, its people, and the corporations that 
employ them by ensuring that Angola continues to enjoy stability and that a return to violence or 
unpredictable governance remains unlikely. To ensure predictability, it may be in China’s 
interests to ensure that large changes to governance do not occur rapidly and that the ruling party 
stays in power, but there is no evidence that China works to ensure such outcomes in Angola. 
China’s lack of political conditions on its loans has allowed the ruling MPLA to consolidate 
power and to make governance in the country more corrupt and opaque.34 
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However, China, in an extension of its efforts to clean up domestic corruption, has 
cracked down on the corruption of Chinese investors abroad, including those who, while 
working on behalf of Chinese state-owned enterprises, overpaid for rights to extract oil from 
blocks in Angola to bribe or kick back funds to Angolan officials.35 What is more, China cited 
issues related to Angolan government transparency in its denial to extend a $15 billion loan from 
the CDB to the financially struggling Angolan state-owned oil company, Sonangol.36 This 
suggests that while China desires continued stability in Angolan institutions, it is not willing to 
do so at the risk of falling victim of the endemic corruption in the Angolan regime. 
Economic 
 Access to oil is certainly on the minds of China’s leadership. However, in addition to 
loans for infrastructure improvements that directly aid in oil extraction, Chinese loans also go 
toward non-oil projects, such as the building of large-scale housing projects, schools, and 
hospitals as well as soccer stadiums.37 While part of this is likely to promote Chinese soft power, 
and possibly to diversify the Angolan economy and prevent instability in the wake of oil shocks, 
such funding opens new avenues that China can exploit to provide jobs to its citizens—China 
often sends Chinese laborers to work on projects—and export markets for Chinese goods.   
 In addition, the exportation of Chinese goods and services may be vital to the security of 
the CCP at home. With an economic slowdown, China risks losing the massive levels of growth 
it has seen since it undertook market reforms in the 1990s. Stefan Halper argues that by 
increasing its growth and enabling its citizens to work and make a decent living, the CCP can 
circumvent major calls for reform in governance.38 Only by providing “consistent growth at a 
rate that is unprecedented” can the CCP retain the legitimacy to rule without being forced to 
reform itself or be held accountable for the massive income and social inequality that has arisen 
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because of China’s market liberalization.39 With its own domestic infrastructure needs on the 
decline, it makes sense that China and the CCP would look to new markets to increase 
exportation of the products and expertise from vital industries. Thus, while securing oil in 
Angola is certainly important, merely using Chinese companies and Chinese workers to rebuild 
Angola helps China because it provides work and capital to Chinese citizens and helps offset any 
losses in Chinese domestic growth. 
Activities 
 China’s initial loan offering to Angola in 2002 was for $2 billion, payable over 17-years 
at an interest rate set at London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) plus 1.5% after a 5-year grace 
period.40 This loan from the China Exim Bank was extended by an additional $2.5 billion by 
2007.41 By 2010, just eight years after China provided its first loan to Angola, a total of $10 
billion was pledged to Angola from the China Exim Bank alone, for which loans after the initial 
$4.5 billion were given the interest rate of LIBOR plus 1.25%.42 
These loans, like most from the China Exim Bank, are resource-backed, meaning that the 
interest payments are guaranteed by the sale of oil to China, which ensures China a minimum 
amount of this resource.43 Oil is sold to China by the Angolan state oil-company, Sonangol, at 
the international spot price on the day of shipment, and the revenues are deposited into an 
account at the China Exim Bank in Angola’s name.44 These revenues are then distributed by the 
China Exim Bank directly to the Chinese companies tendered to complete the joint Angola-
China approved infrastructure projects as laid out in the initial framework agreement.45 The 
management of the loans is left to the Angolan government.46 
The China Exim Bank is the primary lender to both Angola and the rest of Africa, having 
served as the lender for nearly all Chinese loans to Africa’s until 2011 and accounting for more 
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than half of Chinese loans to Africa as of 2014.47 But direct Chinese assistance also comes from 
the CDB and other Chinese financiers. The CDB, for instance, has given at least $1.5 billion to 
China’s agricultural sector and, in 2014, gave a $2 billion loan to Sonangol—which has also 
partnered with the Chinese state-owned oil company Sinopec and private Chinese companies to 
extract oil from blocks off the Angolan coast—and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
has given $2.5 billion in general finance as of 2015.48 At least one CDB loan was not oil-backed, 
and there is reason to believe other non-oil backed loans exist.49 Angola, which wants to move 
away from the traditional “Angola Model,” prefers non-oil backed loans, but China continues to 
see oil-backed loans as the most secure and predictable of loan structures.50 Given that China is 
the supplier of funds, the Chinese preference has largely won out. 
Regardless of the method, the stated goal of China’s loans is to help create a market for 
investment into Angola.51 Because of a lack of transparency in both Angola and China, it is 
difficult to accurately assess the impacts of Chinese state-owned enterprises and other Chinese 
non-government entities’ investment in Angola. Much of the investment has seemingly gone into 
the oil sector, but the need for economic diversification in Angola has led several firms to invest 
in non-oil sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing; and Chinese citizens have opened 
shops to sell low-cost, low-end Chinese manufactured goods that have trouble finding a market 
in the West and domestic China.52 
In total, direct loans from China to Angola from 2000 to 2014 amount to a quarter of all 
loans from China to Africa in that period—$21.2 billion, $17.8 billion of which went to 
extractive industries.53 Foreign direct investment (FDI) flow from China to Angola, from 2003 to 
2015, totals $462.3 million with FDI stock worth $6.5 billion.54 Through this process, China has 
become Angola’s largest export destination and Angola has become China’s largest African 
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source of imports, with 99.1% of that trade being crude petroleum ($14.3 billion worth of crude 
in 2015 alone).55 Angola is China’s third largest oil supplier, behind Saudi Arabia and Russia.56 
This suggests that China is in Angola solely for oil, but such statistics do not include the service 
of construction as an export and thus cannot fully explain the reciprocal nature of the 
relationship. 
Conclusions and Outlook 
 China’s involvement in Angola has resulted in a wealth of Chinese-built construction in 
Angola and a steady flow of oil to China. It is less clear how China’s involvement has benefited 
Angola. Chinese funds bypass Angolan banks in order to reduce the risk of corruption, meaning 
much of the funding going to Angola does not actually end up in the Angolan economy. In 
addition, even though China (which often sends its own laborers abroad) agreed to hire Angolans  
for at least 30% of the workforce of each project, the Chinese Ambassador to Angola said that to 
do so is “impossible.”57 With an unemployment rate just under 27% and two-thirds of all 
Angolans living on less than $2 a day, Angolans are unable to afford the necessities of life, much 
less the nearly empty Chinese-built apartments built in new Luandan suburbs.58 All of this is 
worsened by the near 50% global drop in oil prices in 2014. With oil comprising 97% of all 
Angola’s exports, on average, over the last ten years and oil revenues consisting of 95% of 
Angola’s export income, the drop has stalled economic growth, which fell to just 0.6% in 2016, 
and boosted the inflation rate from just over 5% in 2014 to a high of over 40% in 2016.59 
 Angola is still in dire need of post-war reconstruction, and China has the ability to 
undertake the long-term task more quickly than Angola could itself. But, in the short-term, the 
Chinese approach combined with Angolan governance is turning Angolan-citizen perceptions 
against China and the Angolan elite.60 Whether this impacts China and how it deals with Angola 
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remains to be seen, as does the question of how Angola deals with China after President José 
Eduardo dos Santos eventually steps down. While Chinese involvement helped dos Santos 
consolidate power, there are growing demands for transparency and equity that may impact 
China. But there is no evidence yet that China has an active policy to manage this change. 
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Chinese Engagement in Venezuela 
Historical Context 
Hugo Chávez, Venezuela’s president from 1999 to 2013, once described his country’s 
relationship with China as stretching “del subsuelo a la estratosfera,” from underground to the 
stratosphere: not only had China become an important destination for Venezuelan oil, it was also 
becoming an important source of advanced electronics, including satellite technologies.61 In 
effect, in the first decades of the twenty-first century, bilateral trade between the countries has 
increased nearly a hundredfold, from around $120 million in 1999 to $11.38 billion in 2015.62 
Even more impressive is the growth in Chinese lending, which between 2006 and 2017 totaled 
$62.2 billion. In fact, Venezuela has received more Chinese loans than any other Latin American 
country, nearly double the amount given over that period to the second highest recipient, Brazil, 
which received $36.8 billion.63  
Since the global collapse in oil prices in 2014, which (along with domestic policies) 
plunged Venezuela into an economic and political crisis, China has continued to provide loans 
and lines of credit—in effect, extending a lifeline to the regime of Nicolás Maduro, Chávez’s 
successor.64 China’s current support for this increasingly fragile country suggests that it seeks to 
ensure regional stability and long-term access to natural resources. 
Interests 
China’s chief interest in Venezuela is oil. The majority of its investment there has been in 
the form of commodity-backed loans, whereby Venezuela receives foreign capital from China in 
exchange for this strategic resource. China gets around 9-10% of its imported refined oil and 
around 3-5% of its imported crude oil from Venezuela. Imports from other countries are 
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currently larger, but Venezuela has the largest proven oil reserves in the world, making it an 
important source for the future growth.65 
A second interest, closely related to the first, is ensuring repayment of its billions of 
dollars in loans. Given how much money China has already invested, a default from Venezuela 
would be very costly. Many loan deals were made without approval from Venezuela’s National 
Assembly, and a future Venezuelan administration could conceivably repudiate them as illegal or 
“odious.” To address this concern, China has renegotiated loan repayments to terms favorable to 
Venezuela, and has met with leaders of the opposition.66 
Third, China has an interest in protecting its trade. While Venezuela is not a major 
destination for its goods—in 2015 it accounted for just 0.22% of China’s exports—in absolute 
terms this trade is nevertheless significant: $5.31 billion in 2015.67 Perhaps more importantly, as 
described below, a large portion of the money China loans to Venezuela returns to Chinese 
companies in the form of contracts.68 
A final interest is regional stability. A total collapse in Venezuela could have disastrous 
consequences for neighboring states, where China has an increasingly large presence. Ensuring 
continued stability for Venezuela may help protect its investments throughout Latin America and 
bolster its image as a positive force in the region. 
Activities 
 China’s involvement with Latin America dates to the turn of the twenty-first century with 
the promotion of the “Going Out” strategy.69 Trade with grew Latin America from $12.6 billion 
in 2000 to $26.1 billion in 2013,70 as China exported manufactured goods and imported 
commodities like iron, cooper, soy, and crucially, oil.71 As Chinese companies and entrepreneurs 
have begun to operate throughout the region, the government has played an increasingly active 
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role, signing bilateral and multilateral agreements. Through the CDB and, to a much lesser 
extent, Exim Bank, it has provided the region with financing in the amount of $141.3 billion 
between 2005 and 2016.72  
 China has outlined its official approach to Latin America in two white papers: its first, 
released just ahead of Hu Jintao’s Latin American tour in 2008, expressed the government’s will 
to establish “win-win” cooperation  with the region in the economic, political, cultural, and 
security spheres; the second, published in November 2016, highlighted many of the same 
themes, and further stressed the importance of multilateral cooperation.73 China’s primary 
vehicle for multilateral cooperation is the recently established Community of Latin American 
and Caribbean States (CELAC), which, unlike the Organization of American States (OAS), 
excludes the US. In January 2015, Beijing hosted the first China-CELAC forum, at which Xi 
predicted $500 billion in trade and $250 billion in investment over the next ten years.74 
Chinese leaders, always fond of numeric aphorisms, have also outlined a “1+3+6 
cooperation framework” and a “3x3 cooperation model,” which identify many of the same 
objectives.75 The white papers and the awkwardly named cooperation schemes are more than 
mere rhetoric, because they signal the Chinese government’s intention to engage with the region 
as a whole. Nevertheless, some scholars caution against giving too much credence to the 
government’s talk of a unified strategy, pointing out that China’s economic impact is the product 
of multiple actors,76 and that its effects have been overwhelmingly focused on commodity-
exporting nations.77 
In Venezuela, the situation is at once simpler and more opaque: simpler in that oil 
dominates the two countries’ relationship—it has always been more subsuelo than estratosfera—
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and more opaque in that, as with many other countries, the details of the commodity-backed 
loans are not public.78  
Chávez took office in 1999 and quickly sought to lessen his country’s dependence on 
exports to U.S. oil markets. In 2007, he nationalized the oil operations of U.S.-owned 
ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil when they refused to give majority control to Petróleos de 
Venezuela, SA (PDVSA), prompting them to leave the country. For Chávez, China offered a 
way to lessen his country’s dependence on US markets; for China, Venezuela offered long-term 
access to oil. As described by Liu Kegu, CDB’s representative in Venezuela, China’s interests 
are straightforward: “We have lots of capital and lack resources, they have lots of resources and 
lack capital, it’s complementary.”79 
Yet the details of this relationship are more complicated. CDB began investing in the 
country in 2008, creating a joint investment fund (JIF) with Venezuela’s Banco de Desarrollo 
Económico y Social (BANDES). By 2009, the fund had $12 billion, with $8 billion contributed 
by CDB and $4 billion by BANDES, and in 2010, CDB and BANDES, along with PDVSA and 
Chinaoil, signed a separate $20 billion deal.80 In both cases, China offers commodity-backed 
loans through CDB: oil produced by PDVSA is sold to a Chinese company such as Chinaoil, 
which deposits the money into the BANDES account at CDB, which then deducts the amount 
from the loan balance. The amount purchased fluctuates depending on price. In the case of the 
2010 deal, for example, it varies from 107,000 to 157,000 barrels per day (b/d). Subsequent loans 
have increased the total amount that Venezuela exports, and it now has agreements to provide 
China with around 180,000 b/d of refined fuel and around 295,000 b/d of crude.81 Despite its 
growing importance, however, China has not displaced the United States as a trading partner. 
Venezuela still exported 44% of its oil to the U.S. in 2015, more than double the amount 
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exported to China (19%).82 More importantly, China gets only a minor part of its oil from 
Venezuela—just 3.6% of its imported crude oil in 2015.83 Perhaps surprisingly, Chinese 
companies, lacking the refining capabilities for extra-heavy Venezuelan crude, do not appear to 
import much of the crude Venezuela sells them, selling it instead to refineries in Houston. After 
selling in the US, China can import an equivalent amount from less distant locations, avoiding 
the need to ship it across the Pacific.84   
Venezuela has put much of the money it gets from these loans toward social programs 
and infrastructure, rather than using it to upgrade its oil production capacity.85 This spending has 
directly benefited Chinese companies, which win contracts to complete these infrastructure 
projects to building housing, roads, rail lines, power plants, irrigation systems, and more. The 
“win-win” here seems to be that China secures oil for the future and helps its firms expand 
globally.86  
Venezuela’s failure to invest in its oil infrastructure has had serious consequences. Plans 
to boost oil production to 5.8 million b/d by 2012 were never achieved, and a later target of 4 
million b/d by 2014 also proved beyond reach.87 Venezuela’s production remained at around 3 
million thereafter, greatly limiting Venezuela’s revenue.88 Its current production level is around 
2.5 million b/d, its lowest in history, and it is failing to meet its commitments exports to China 
and other countries.89  
After Chávez’s death in 2013, and Maduro’s arrival in office, the problems in 
Venezuela’s economy became even more apparent. Shale oil began to flood the global market in 
2014, dramatically lowering the price of a barrel of oil, from over $100 in 2014 to an average of 
around $40 in today.90 Protests erupted in Venezuela in 2014, and in 2015 the opposition won a 
majority of seats in the National Assembly. China reaffirmed its commitment to the Maduro 
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government, announcing a “comprehensive strategic partnership” in 2014, and renegotiated the 
terms of loan repayments in 2016. It has continued to provide financial support to the 
government in the form of loans and, most recently, in November 2016, a $2.2 billion line of 
credit. Keenly aware that a Venezuelan default could be disastrous, Beijing has also reportedly 
met with opposition leaders, some of whom have voiced skepticism about the legality of China’s 
loans.91  
As of this writing, Venezuela’s crisis continues to deepen. Its people now face shortages 
of basic goods and an inflation rate as high as 800%.92 The Maduro-appointed Supreme Court 
recently attempted to strip the National Assembly of its powers, but backed down after intense 
international criticism, including threats of expulsion from the OAS. In early April 2017, anti-
Maduro protestors were again marching throughout the country, suggesting that the political and 
economic situation is unlikely to improve in the immediate future. 
Conclusions and Outlook 
By continuing to invest in Venezuela, even as the country teeters on the brink of chaos, 
China appears to be seeking to protect its long-term investments, but without any overt interference 
or engagement in Venezuela’s political crisis. Given the importance it places on noninterference 
and the mutual respect for internal affairs, it is unwilling to consider direct (e.g. military) action to 
maintain stability. However, its continued economic support is playing a decisive role in Maduro’s 
ability to govern. Though it does not depend heavily on Venezuelan oil or markets for its 
immediate growth, China appears to want to secure resources from multiple sources, hedging its 
bet for future needs, by maintaining a strong presence in Venezuela and the wider region. 
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Chinese Engagement in Nepal 
Historical Context 
Due to their proximity, China and Nepal have a relationship that stretches back millennia. 
However, in the decades following the Chinese Communist Party’s rise to power and the 
creation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Beijing took a relatively limited approach to 
relatively tiny Nepal. This primarily consisted of Chinese aid for infrastructure projects to 
facilitate trade, as well as a number of small scale factories that manufactured light goods such as 
textiles and bricks. 93 China also exerted political pressure on Nepal over the issue of Tibetans 
fleeing across the border, though initially the Chinese took a relatively light approach to this.94  
During the Nepalese Civil War (1996-2006), when Maoist insurgents (Communist Party 
of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M)) seeking to overthrow Nepal’s monarchy fought government forces, 
China continued to play a minimal role. While officially supporting the royal government of 
Nepal and labeling the Maoist insurgents as a terrorist group, the Chinese government also 
emphasized that it would not intervene in the conflict.95 However, following the success of the 
CPN-M in securing a peace agreement in 2006 that abolished the monarchy, and CPN-M’s major 
electoral victories in 2008, China was quick to normalize relations with the Maoists and cultivate 
stronger ties with the party.96 Since then, the Chinese government has sought to take advantage 
of these warmer relations and expand its political and economic outreach to Nepal. 
Interests 
Geopolitical  
One of China’s main interests in Nepal is reducing the influence of its other neighbor and 
geopolitical rival, India. Sometimes described as a “yam between two stones”, Nepal has long 
been viewed by both giant powers as a potential satellite state that could be used as a buffer 
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against the other.97 Geographical, cultural, and economic ties have historically tilted this balance 
towards India. However, there is growing discontent with what is perceived by Nepalis as 
excessive Indian interference in Nepal’s politics.98 This political climate is perceived by Beijing 
as an opening to utilize financial resources to help bring Nepal into its orbit, or at least erode 
India’s influence.  
Financial 
The potential for economic gain is a large consideration for China’s approach to Nepal, 
and one aspect of this is trade. For decades, China has worked to create a trade surplus with its 
southwestern neighbor by exporting a large quantity of manufactured goods.99 Maintaining these 
avenues of trade, both politically through free trade agreements, and physically through 
infrastructure, is therefore a high priority. Trade is also important in the broader context of 
China’s OBOR initiative, with Kathmandu serving as a potential hub for goods moving between 
India and China.100 
 Another mechanism of economic gain for China is direct investment in Nepali industry 
and infrastructure, in particular, hydropower. China is unable to extract the electric output from 
dams in Nepal directly back to China, as it has done with projects in some other water rich 
countries (e.g. Myanmar). The physical barrier posed by the Himalayan Mountains makes it too 
costly to build the infrastructure necessary to carry massive amounts of power from Nepal back 
to China. However, Chinese companies can earn large returns on their investments by selling the 
electricity created by their dams to the Nepalese. With the potential to produce over 83,000 
megawatts of electricity, but currently only producing 900 megawatts, Nepal’s waterways offer a 
large amount of untapped financial potential.101 These projects would also help curb Nepal’s 
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perennial blackouts, thereby earning a political and public diplomacy victory with the Nepali 
people. 
Stability and Tibet 
Its own internal stability and the security of Tibet figures significantly in China’s Nepal 
policy. Since the 1959 revolt in Tibet’s capital, Lhasa, Nepal’s treatment of Tibetans fleeing 
across the border has been a constant source of friction. Starting in 1959, Nepal legally 
recognized Tibetans who made it across the Chinese border as refugees, and allowed them to 
either stay as legal residents or continue to India, where the Tibetan government in exile was 
headquartered.102 This policy changed in 1989, though, when the Nepali government sought to 
cultivate better relations with China. While Nepal stopped recognizing Tibetans as legitimate 
refugees, it reached what become known as the “Gentleman’s Agreement” with the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This arrangement stipulated that Tibetans 
who were apprehended by Nepali police at the border were to be handed over to UNHCR, who 
would then ensure that they received third-party resettlement in India.103 Under this agreement, 
more than 40,000 Tibetans passed through Nepal to India, with little more than pro forma 
condemnation from Beijing.104 However, the major protests and unrest by Tibetans in both China 
and Nepal surrounding the 2008 Beijing Olympics rattled the Chinese government, causing it to 
reconsider its tacit acceptance of the “Gentleman’s Agreement.” It fears that Nepal, which has a 
Tibetan population of over 13,000, may become a hotbed of Tibetan protest and dissent, which 
could spill across the border into China and thereby threaten Communist rule and China’s 
dominion over Tibet.105  
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Activities 
Economic 
Over the past few years, China has worked to substantially increase its economic 
footprint in Nepal. According to official statistics, between 2015 and 2016 the Chinese 
government quintupled its official direct assistance (ODA) to Nepal, from $24 million to over 
$128 million.106 Chinese investment in Nepal has also increased rapidly. In 2012, Chinese FDI 
had constituted 30.89% of Nepal’s total FDI commitments for that year.107 By the first half of 
Fiscal Year 2016-2017, this number had increased to 68% of total investment commitments in 
the country.108  
While it is difficult to disaggregate much of this data due to the opaque nature of official 
Chinese statistics, it is clear that a large sum of this aid and investment are concessional loans 
geared toward various forms of infrastructure development. Perhaps the most important of these 
is a $1.6 billion hydroelectric project being built on the West Seti River by the China’s Three 
Gorges International Corporation. While China has completed several smaller dam and water 
resource projects in Nepal in the past, they all pale in comparison.109 The Three Gorges project is 
the largest single foreign investment in the history of Nepal, and is set to nearly double Nepal’s 
current electric output. The potential profits for China from this project are enormous, since the 
Nepali government will be required to buy the electricity produced by this dam from China.110 
Additionally, infrastructure investment and development are also important for 
facilitating trade with Nepal. Over the past 60 years, China has funded more than ten projects to 
improve highways within Nepal to make it easier to transport goods across the border and around 
Nepal.111 Recently, however, China has looked to go beyond roads and invest in other forms of 
transportation infrastructure. In 2013, for instance, a Chinese state-owned enterprise agreed to a 
$145 million concessional loan to build a new international airport in Pokhara that will service 
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both goods and tourists.112 One of the most talked about projects is a proposed high-speed rail 
that would connect Lhasa with Kathmandu. While the Chinese government is eager to begin this 
project, political infighting in the Nepali Parliament has put the project on hold.113 Nonetheless, 
China is looking to increase its trade volume with Nepal, and is willing to help build the 
infrastructure necessary to do it. 
Security  
The other area in which China has actively ratcheted up its level of engagement is in in 
security. This mainly centers around China’s domestic issue of Tibet rather than in shoring up 
Nepal’s still fragile government structures. Since the Tibet-related unrest of 2008, China has 
been encouraging the Nepali government to break the UNHCR-brokered “Gentlemen’s 
Agreement” and crack down on Tibetan “anti-Chinese” activities. One way of doing this has 
been to threaten to cut aid projects in order to pressure Nepal into signing a dozen security 
agreements that commit it to curbing “illegal immigration.”114 At times, this coercive behavior 
has reached down to the local level, with Chinese intelligence officials from the embassy 
reportedly visiting local police stations in Nepal to demand that Tibetan protest activities be dealt 
with properly.115 
In addition to these political pressures, China has also invested heavily in building 
Nepal’s capacity to more effectively apprehend Tibetans coming across the border and quell 
domestic dissent. For instance, since 2010, the Chinese government has offered multiple all-
expense-paid training sessions in Beijing for Nepali border agents in order to help them stop 
“illegal border exit-entry activities.”116 In 2012, China donated $1.6 million to establish a new 
academy to train officers of Nepal’s Armed Policy Force, which staff posts across the Tibetan 
border.117 The following year, the Chinese government provided Nepali police with over $6 
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million worth of digital surveillance equipment, which makes it possible to track the exact 
whereabouts of a particular cellphone user.118 Because of these policies, the annual number of 
Tibetans successfully escaping from China and making it to India has dropped from around 
2,200 in 2008 to around 1,000 in 2011, and then to only 171 in 2013.119 In this way, China has 
been successful in utilizing its increased influence in the area to bring “stability” to Nepal, and 
more importantly Tibet.  
Finally, while not related to Tibet, a significant development in Sino-Nepali security 
relations is the recent announcement that the two countries will hold joint military exercises for 
the first time in modern history.120 In conjunction with these exercises, which took place between 
April 16 and 25, 2017, and focused on counterterrorism and humanitarian disasters, China has 
also promised a $44 million military aid package to assist Nepal in its UN peacekeeping 
efforts.121 While the ramifications of these new developments are not yet known, what is clear is 
that China is looking to bring its security relations with Nepal to unprecedented levels.  
Conclusions and Outlook 
Over the past decade, China has made a significant effort to cultivate stronger economic 
and security ties with Nepal. Some of these policies are mutually beneficial, such as concessional 
loans to build major infrastructure projects that underdeveloped Nepal would have never been 
able to build on their own. These sorts of activities, whether motivated by profits or altruism, 
have greatly helped China’s image in Nepal. This is especially true after the 2015 “blockade” of 
humanitarian assistance and fuel from India, with an increasing number of Nepalis beginning to 
lean away from New Delhi and towards Beijing.122 China’s actions with relation to Tibetans in 
Nepal have been far more coercive, and have gone against China’s self-proclaimed adherence to 
non-intervention, but it is less engaged when it comes to Nepal’s own internal fragility. 
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Chinese Engagement in Afghanistan 
Historical Context 
China and Afghanistan have had a consistent but limited relationship for most of the past 
century. The two countries established diplomatic ties in 1955, and then had a few quiet decades. 
Their early relationship was built around a small amount of trade, as well as a border 
agreement.123  When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1980, China registered Afghanistan 
higher on its list of security concerns, in large part because of geostrategic claustrophobia 
induced by the Soviet Union; their occupation of Afghanistan effectively left China surrounded 
by Soviet-influenced countries. China, through its ally Pakistan, provided aid to the Mujahideen, 
allowed the U.S. to monitor the Soviets from facilities in the Xinjiang province, and also allowed 
Xinjiang to be used as a training camp for the Mujahideen.124 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan 
was one of the primary points of contention in its relationship with the USSR until the Soviets 
left in 1989.125   
In the mid-1990s, the Taliban took over Afghanistan, and while China never formally 
recognized the regime, they had at least occasional communication. When the U.S. invasion 
removed the Taliban from power and installed a new government in 2001, China and 
Afghanistan’s relationship became much more active, and high-level communication with the 
new government became much more consistent. China was one of the first countries to establish 
official relations with the New Afghan government, and it quickly provided a small amount of 
emergency humanitarian aid.126 In 2006, China and Afghanistan signed the Treaty of Good 
Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation, which set a framework for their future relationship. In 
addition to agreeing to cooperate on issues of terrorism and drug trafficking, it also laid out 
P A G E  | 31 
 
economic goals, including China’s plans to assist in the mining of natural resources and 
development of infrastructure.127  
China has never been the major foreign influence in Afghanistan. During the Cold War, 
Afghanistan fell primarily under the Soviet sphere of influence, and when the Taliban was in 
power, China had little clout with a regime it did not recognize. When the Taliban fell, the 
United States and the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), primarily made up of 
Western troops, became the major international influence.128 Thus, even though China has 
considered Afghanistan to be a crucial security concern for decades, primarily because of 
concerns about its own domestic vulnerabilities, it has still chosen and managed to play a 
relatively indirect role in Afghanistan. 
Interests  
China has a variety of geostrategic, economic, and security interests in Afghanistan. 
Although China and Afghanistan share only a few miles of a ruggedly mountainous and 
inhospitable border, Afghanistan’s proximity is simultaneously a security risk and an economic 
opportunity. China is concerned about the potential for Afghanistan’s security problems, 
including terrorism and drug trafficking, to spill over across the border. In particular, China is 
worried about ties between Uyghur separatists in the Xinjiang province (which borders 
Afghanistan) and terrorist groups based in or training in Afghanistan.129 This relationship 
between the separatists and the Taliban goes back many years, but became particularly strong 
when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan in the mid-1990s.130 This concern fits a pattern of 
engagement by China, as noted by Elizabeth Wishnick, who describes China’s security policy as 
nested: at the center are China’s domestic concerns, around which regional and global policy is 
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built.131 China’s decisions about Afghanistan are made with careful consideration of its own 
domestic security implications. 
China also has economic interests in Afghanistan. By U.S. estimates, Afghanistan is 
sitting on over $1 trillion of untapped mineral resources.132 These resources range from base and 
precious metals like copper, iron, and gold to industrial minerals like talc to mineral fuels, 
including coal, gas, and some oil.133 China’s interest in tapping these materials was initially 
driven by regional representatives of Chinese state-owned enterprises, but has now been 
embraced by the government for both the economic benefits and its anxiety over resource 
scarcity.134 Furthermore, China sees Afghanistan as a future part of its regional trade ambitions; 
Afghanistan is an important part of the OBOR initiative. 
Finally, while China has not historically been the major influence in Afghanistan, it 
became more interested in increasing and maintaining influence in South and Central Asia, 
particularly as the Central Asian economies opened up and other major powers increased 
military and economic ties with the region.135 It has been difficult for China to assert a high level 
of influence in Afghanistan, in part because of its reluctance to take a firm stance on which side 
it supports in Afghanistan’s political turmoil, as well as the history of foreign influence or 
domination, first by the Soviet Union and now by the U.S. Nonetheless, long-term regional 
ambitions clearly factor into China’s Afghanistan policy. 
Activities 
Security 
Despite the fact that China has long considered Afghanistan to be a major security 
concern, it has kept a low profile there, and it carefully selects its actions and its venues for 
support. While it has increased its foreign aid funding in recent years and stepped up its 
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participation in efforts to negotiate a peace agreement between the government and the Taliban, 
China’s aid to Afghanistan is small in comparison to what it does in other countries and in 
comparison to what other donors provide to Afghanistan. Traditionally, China’s presence has 
been indirect and subtle.  There are a few key reasons for this. First, large numbers of Western 
forces have been stationed in Afghanistan since 2001, so it has not been necessary for China to 
send its own forces; China is not necessarily interested in competing for influence from behind. 
In some ways, the strong Western presence has allowed China to effectively be a free rider. 
Secondly, China has been adamant in striking a delicate balance between supporting the nascent, 
post-Taliban Afghan government, and yet not completely alienating the Taliban. China fears that 
if it favors the Afghan government too overtly, it will expose itself to terrorist attacks by 
Taliban-supported groups within its own borders.136 This balance is evident in the following 
example: China did not fight the decision to create the ISAF, nor did it use its Security Council 
veto to inhibit Afghanistan operations, but it continues to refuse to send any Chinese troops, 
money, or equipment in support of the ISAF.  
China has regularly stated that Afghanistan’s political future must be decided by 
Afghanistan. However, it exhibits a degree of influence on this issue through leadership in 
multilateral mechanisms and organizations. In 2016, China began taking a larger role in the 
Afghan peace process, involving the Afghan government, the Taliban, and Pakistan.137 China has 
placed itself in a unique position to play this role. It has expanded its relationship with the 
Afghan government while not totally alienating the Taliban. It is also hoping to utilize its 
alliance with Pakistan to persuade Islamabad that ignoring the Afghan Taliban is not in 
Pakistan’s interests.138 Its stance on the future of Afghanistan and the role of the international 
community relies on “five supports.” These supports include an “Afghan-led and Afghan-
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owned” peace process and capacity-building.139 Under this framework, China also seeks to 
encourage Afghanistan to participate more in regional organizations, and, where Afghanistan is 
not a member, China at least seeks to get the Afghanistan issue on the agenda. For example, 
Afghanistan has always been a significant concern for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), a regional economic and security organization that evolved out of a previous organization 
in mid-2001.140 Afghanistan is still not a full member, but it later became an observer state along 
with Iran, Pakistan, and India. There are limitations to what the SCO can do, as it is not well 
equipped to actively address security concerns. However, despite these limitations, the SCO has 
been very active and vocal about resolving the Afghanistan issue both in the region and more 
internationally. 
In the past three years, there have been a handful of new developments that suggest China 
is increasing its presence and role in Afghanistan on security issues. For example, while China 
adamantly denies that it will send troops to replace the Western forces that are currently drawing 
down, it offered $70 million of direct military aid, reportedly in the form of security equipment 
and training, for the first time in 2015.141 Additionally, despite consistently stating publicly that 
Afghanistan should decide its political future internally, China has still played a role in future 
governance by taking on a leadership role in the peace process. 
 China has also increased the amount of overall foreign aid that it provides to Afghanistan. 
China gave Afghanistan roughly $240 million dollars in the 12-year-period between 2001 and 
2013, but $80 million in the year 2014 alone.142 At a meeting in October 2014, President Ashraf 
Ghani and President Xi Jinping released a joint statement on China’s intention to provide 
Afghanistan with $327 million in aid through 2017.143 This is still a relatively small amount of 
aid; the U.S., for example, has disbursed roughly $17 billion dollars in aid to Afghanistan.144 It is 
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also a small amount relative to China’s capacity and its aid projects elsewhere. Still, the increase 
from 2014 on is notable and reflective of what appears to be an increasing presence.  
Economics 
Afghanistan and China’s ties were limited when the two countries established diplomatic 
ties in the 1950s, but they established economic cooperation early on. Their trade relationship 
has grown significantly in the past decade; between 2002 and 2010, total trade between China 
and Afghanistan increased from $20 million to $715 million.145 Bilateral trade has continued to 
increase in the subsequent years and has remained extremely lopsided; according to Afghan 
statistics, in 2015, Afghanistan exported just over $10 million to China and imported more than 
$1 billion from China. Their exports to China included spices, some animal products, and 
carpets, while imports from China included a variety of products ranging from meat to medicine 
to manufactured goods.146  
 When former president Hamid Karzai opened Afghan industries to foreign investment in 
the mid to late 2000s, Chinese state-owned enterprises made major investments into future 
resource development projects. For example, in 2008, Chinese companies China Metallurgical 
Group Corporation (MCC) and the Jiangxi Copper Company Limited (JCL) invested in a multi-
billion dollar, 30-year lease of a copper mine at Mes Aynak, widely thought to be the second 
largest unexploited copper deposit in the world. In addition to mining the copper, China was to 
provide the mining infrastructure, power plants, and a railway leading to the copper mine.147 The 
project has the potential to create thousands of indirect and direct jobs in Afghanistan, as well as 
an estimated $250 million in annual revenue for Afghanistan,148 but many argue that Afghanistan 
will gain little compared with the benefits China will receive. Additionally, in 2011, the China 
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National Petroleum Corporation announced a $600 million investment with an Afghan resource 
company to develop three oil blocks in the Amu Darya basin.149    
The full benefits of these projects are not yet known. Following the rush to invest in 
projects in the mid-to-late 2000s, little has been done, and many of China’s ambitious plans in 
Afghanistan have been stalled. For example, no copper has been mined at Mes Aynak yet, 
despite the fact that the tenth anniversary of China’s lease is approaching.150 The blame for this 
slow progress has typically been placed on the security issue, but there have been other problems 
along the way, including contract disputes. 
In addition to its interest in extracting Afghanistan’s resources, China considers 
Afghanistan to be a crucial part of its Silk Road Economic Belt strategy, a project to build the 
infrastructure to connect Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East as part of the OBOR 
initiative to improve trade.151 The initial steps to include Afghanistan in the project have already 
been taken; Afghanistan and China have signed a memorandum of understanding regarding 
OBOR, and China has moved some OBOR fund money to Afghanistan. That said, as with other 
Chinese investment projects in Afghanistan, there has been only minor movement on the more 
concrete steps.152 
Conclusions and Outlook 
While China has stepped up its political and economic role in Afghanistan, it has not yet 
affected Afghanistan’s governance or played a major economic role. China is not the major 
international influence in Afghanistan. However, China’s actions, primarily its investment 
projects and role in the peace process, have generally been viewed positively by Afghan 
leadership, and as Western forces leave, Afghanistan views China as a country that could 
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potentially fill that aid gap. Communities in Afghanistan are, however fearful that they will never 
see any benefits from the resource projects.153   
There is a potential that China will play a larger role in Afghanistan. As ISAF draws 
down its military mission, Afghanistan will still rely heavily on international aid and support for 
both its security and economic development. China has not traditionally given much aid, but it 
may do so in the future, something that Afghanistan would likely welcome. Furthermore, other 
powers, for their own reasons, have thus far not been as eager as might be expected to rush in to 
tap into Afghanistan’s natural resources. China’s more risk-tolerant state-owned enterprises are 
well suited to take on those projects, and China’s proximity to Afghanistan may give it an 
advantage. However, as China remains unwilling to send its own troops or get involved militarily 
in Afghanistan, security concerns may linger, leading to new difficulties down the road. 
Notwithstanding these changes, China has consistently sought a balance between trying 
to mitigate the instability in Afghanistan and protecting what it perceives to be its own 
vulnerability. Even as the calculations change, China will likely continue to prioritize its 
domestic security concerns over its other interests in Afghanistan. 
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Findings 
 As these four case studies show, China is pursuing different goals in each of the 
examined fragile states. In Angola and Venezuela, China’s goals are primarily economic—in 
particular, China is interested in expanding its markets for export and investment and securing 
extractive resources for current and future use. While China is pursuing commercial goals in 
Afghanistan and Nepal, China’s focus in these states is in the interest of security, particularly on 
issues that could have domestic implications, especially among minority populations in Tibet and 
Xinjiang. 
 Though the objectives differ, several important commonalities exist in China’s approach 
to each of the states in this study. First, while mutual benefit is a cornerstone of China’s foreign 
policy and is evident in China’s contractual agreements within each case study, recipient states 
do not benefit as much as China, either economically or politically. Agreements are thus heavily 
weighted to ensure China gains as much as it can from them. 
In making agreements with fragile states, we find that China is first motivated by concern 
for its own internal economic and political stability. By securing strategic resources and 
developing international markets for its goods and services, it continues to drive economic 
growth at home and thus maintain legitimacy. This is most clearly seen in the major agreements 
made with Angola and Venezuela. However, in providing security assistance to Nepal and 
Afghanistan, China attempts to ensure domestic political stability by tamping down on dissent 
abroad out of fear it could inspire dissent within its borders. 
Furthermore, Communist ideology does not seem to play a major role in China’s 
decision-making. Rather, the Chinese leadership seems guided by the belief that stability ensures 
security, predictability, economic growth, and continued access to natural resources. It is, 
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perhaps, for this reason that China has ramped up its involvement in UN peacekeeping missions. 
In this regard, China sends more peacekeeping forces than any other permanent Security Council 
member and it does so overwhelmingly to African nations in which it has ongoing economic 
interests.154 
Despite the similarities across the four examined states, we find that China does not 
utilize a specific model for engaging with fragile states. China’s pragmatism ultimately leads it 
to adjust its relationship with each state on a case-by-case basis. However, China does appear to 
have a framework for its approach depending on the need it is trying to fulfill that is customized 
for each state. For instance, while the agreements in Angola and Venezuela have a similar 
overarching framework (“resources for infrastructure”), a closer look shows that China’s 
agreements with each country are tailored according to the governance styles and socioeconomic 
needs of each individual state. 
While we find this framework in fragile states, it is also visible in stable states, such as a 
recent agreement with the UK for China to fund one-third of a nuclear power plant that will be 
constructed by the state-owned China Guangdong Nuclear.155 Yet fragility does become a 
consideration for China’s decisions when it threatens China’s investments or access to resources 
and markets. As in Angola, where China limited its support after corruption impacted China’s 
bottom line, China may alter its approach to Venezuela as it continues to unravel. China may 
also increase its engagement with Afghanistan as the degree of instability changes; and as Nepal 
continues to stabilize, we would expect a larger Chinese footprint. Ultimately, Chinese foreign 
policy, in fragile states or elsewhere, seems guided by a pursuit of stability and economic 
growth. 
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